

PSYCHE AND LOGOS IN THE FRAGMENTS OF HERACLITUS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF SOUL

*In memory of Martin Cyril D'Arcy
whose great soul augmented the lives
of all whom it touched.*

Former students of Francis MacDonald Cornford report that the distinguished Cambridge historian was fond of what he called his "parable of the coins." The point of the parable's instruction was that words, especially philosophers' words, are like coins in that they retain their "shape" or visual appearance over decades and even centuries while their "purchasing power" or meaning may be shifting drastically. The image of a coin with an enduring shape but a varying purchasing power is especially appropriate for the semantic career of one of the most important of Greek philosophical words, *psyche*, traditionally rendered "soul." Visually, *psyche* retained its shape from the earliest Greek literature known to us, which is of course Homer, down to the age of the *koine* spoken in the time of Christ and later used to record the gospels. That was a period of a thousand years of varied and often intense philosophical and religious exploration and development; in those centuries, the meaning of *psyche*, unlike its shape, was far from static.

Among scholars there is at present a widely held view, perhaps approaching consensus, that Socrates played a role in that development which was decisive, epoch marking if not epoch making, so that the last quarter of the fifth century becomes a crucial period¹ in the developmental history of Greek ideas concerning soul. Less widely recognized is the fact that for the centuries preceding Socrates, the first significant changes in usage and meaning for the word *psyche* are to be found in the text of the philosopher Heraclitus who, in a radical break from popular and Homeric belief, claims that the *psyche* of a living person has a *logos* which is "deep" (B45) and "self-augmenting" (B115) and that its discovery requires extensive exploration on the part of the individual (B45). Moreover, this is a cognitive and linguistic task (B107 supported by B87, 114, *passim*), an effort of intellect, which is accomplished only as an individual becomes "awake" or comprehending (B1, 2, 34, 72, 73, *passim*)² of the cosmos around him as well as in him, and only when that individual learns to listen to, and understand, a proper language or discourse, a *logos* (B1, 2, 50, *passim*). It is the failure of *anthropoi*, most contemporary Hellenes, to listen to this *logos*, and consequently their inability to participate cognitively and linguistically at a level of discourse demanded by the philosopher, which so many of the sayings, perhaps a majority, so elegantly castigate.³ If the argument offered in this paper proves correct, Heraclitus' statements about the *logos* of *psyche* are

very much a part of his central mission⁴ as revealed in the collection itself, involving the philosopher in a continuing polemic with *anthropoi* and with the poets,⁵ notably Homer, Hesiod, and their reciters, that is to say, with the epic consciousness that in his day still controlled popular mental and linguistic habit.

A parallel semantic career to that of *psyche* could be traced for *logos* or "discourse" from its first appearance in Greek as the noun for *legein*, 'to speak', to the soaring prologue of the gospel of Saint John, "In the beginning was the *Logos*." The word is rare in Homer, but is more common (and already with multiple meanings)⁶ in the late fifth century; it was, of course, Heraclitus who brought the word into prominence in the professional vocabulary of philosophers. Like *psyche*, *logos* takes on considerable philosophical importance from the turn of the fourth century onward, so that for both words the instruction of Cornford's parable becomes a relevant caution to historians. In terms of Heraclitean usage, *psyche* especially must be clearly and precisely demarcated from the Homeric past; but, at the same time, the philosopher must not, prematurely, be advanced into the Socratic and Platonic future. My discussion, for reasons of space, will concentrate on the two genuine Heraclitean fragments which specifically attribute *logos* to a *psyche* (B45, 115), and one saying (B107) which, as a number of scholars⁷ have argued, alludes to listening to a *logos* in describing an activity of some (barbarous) *psychai* but without *logos* actually appearing in the text.

The sayings which contain both *psyche* and *logos* in their text have been neglected in many recent discussions of *psyche* in Heraclitus in favor of others which can be made to yield complicated physiological reconstructions. These latter often involve theories about the physiological composition of *psyche*, e.g., as composed of reciprocal measures and exchanges of fire, water, and/or earth; or else they resort to theories of "exhalations" of the *psyche* from earthly rivers (or from the underworld rivers of Hades). If the three "psychological" sayings (in the sense that they attribute to *psyche* cognitive or affective activities which we would normally designate "psychological") are discussed at all, they are often converted into physiological statements. Bernays⁸ even emended a perfectly intelligible text in B107 in order to extract the physiological allusion, the change from "barbarous" to "mud" (the words are similar but unrelated in Greek) produced a reassuringly "watery" soul. Below I argue that, at least for the three *psyche/logos* sayings, there is a plausible and natural psychological interpretation; that we need not, therefore, revert to physiological reconstructions in order to explain them; and that Heraclitus' listeners at the turn of the fifth century, who shared the great epic tradition of Greece with him, would have understood his words in the way suggested.

For this task I will ask the reader to hold in mind two ends of an exegetical spectrum simultaneously. At one end of the spectrum is the Socratic

psyche which, as Heraclitus wrote, was still in the future, and a version of which, by reason of Plato's eloquence and the force of Christian teaching, has become familiar to us. At the other end of the spectrum is the far less familiar world of Homer and of oral epic. Yet it is the latter world which the philosopher, like all Greeks of the Archaic period, had inherited, and it governed his vocabulary and thought when he came to define his own views. He uses Homer's psychological vocabulary even when, as in the case of *psyche*, he is manipulating it, for the obvious reason that he, like all other Greeks of the period, knew no other. Only from such a perspective can we appreciate not only the formidable Heraclitean originality, but also his many Homeric dependencies. For even though, as Bruno Snell⁹ (followed by Kahn and others) has argued, it was Heraclitus who launched the word *psyche* on its philosophical and psychological career, the great Ephesian philosopher remained, I suggest, closer to (and more controlled by) the Homeric past—its idiom, its images, and many of its assumptions—than he was to the Socratic future which he helped to make possible. We shall turn first to the *psyche* in Homer.

The Homeric Psyche

Psyche in Homer is often said to have two meanings, "shade" and "life", and that statement is true in the sense that *psyche* has no third meaning. But the close connection between *psyche* and death in Homer indicates that *psyche* is never quite divorced from the meaning "shade" or that shadowy, unsubstantial wraith which, after death, wanders among all the strengthless, sightless dead who inhabit Hades.¹⁰ In Hades, its existence is devoid of *noos* and *phren* (words which primarily denote the exercise of wit or clear perception), the *psyche* there being merely the semblance or image (*eidolon*) of the once living man, but in no sense "him" anymore than would be his reflection in a glass (an apt comparison first made in late antiquity). Prior to death the *psyche*, while residing vaguely somewhere in the body or limbs, is merely the life-breath whose presence confers life, and nothing more, on the person; therefore, no living human being can be without a *psyche*, but it is of no importance until death looms. At death, the *psyche* is of sufficient substantiality to escape from the limbs, or is breathed out through the mouth (as the word's etymology suggests), but also escapes from a wound, or else departs without an exit point being specified.¹¹ More rarely, *psyche* is also absent from the body temporarily in syncope or death-like swoons; and although it is never said to return after these episodes, of course it must if the person revives.¹²

Some scholars, I can anticipate, will conclude that this account stresses excessively the association of *psyche* with death. In defense, I know of only one usage (in two places) in Homer where *psyche* is mentioned and the possessor is very much alive and flourishing, and this, upon examination, may prove instructive. Agenor, in converse with his *thymos*, is distraught

and divided as he (or "they") looks at both sides of the suggestion that, at this moment, the hero might manage to slip away from the terrible battle. The low forest of Mount Ida for cover, and a bath in its cool river, have great immediate appeal; but then Achilles may happen to glance the wrong way, see Agenor sneaking off, and take pursuit, which could prove fatal. Then again, if Agenor stays to fight, perhaps in a moment of surpassing luck he might be the one to kill Achilles and so win great glory. He addresses his *thymos*: "I think even his body might be torn by the sharp bronze/ There is only one life (*psyche*) in him, and people say he is mortal."¹³

Scrutiny of all the *psyche* passages in the poems reveals that *psyche* is of no significance, and is never mentioned, save in situations which involve or threaten or in some way imply death. Thus a man can have his *psyche*, that is, his very life, at risk;¹⁴ like Hector, he can flee a pursuing enemy (Achilles) and have his *psyche* the stake in the race; like young Elpenor, he can break his neck, and "my *psyche* went down into Hades."¹⁵ But even when the translation "life" seems smoother and more natural and is perhaps warranted, the meaning is never really divorced from that of *psyche* as "shade" or "wraith"—that condition which it is man's fate to become at death—and the latter can normally be substituted. This strong connection with death, I would add, may explain why no god has or is a *psyche* in Homer, for like the loss of blood (which also no god has), its loss means death, whereas the gods are *athanatoi*, the deathless ones. *Psyche* is, and for a long time will remain, a distinctively human possession, and so too (with one rule-proving exception),¹⁶ no animal in Homer is said to have one or lose one.

The crucial point, long recognized in Homeric scholarship, is that the *psyche* for early Greeks is not the bearer of the human personality, or in any sense a unitary *psyche* or self, uniting aspects of the personality which we might distinguish as cognitive, emotive, etc., as, for example, *psyche* has become in Plato or Augustine. Emotions such as grief, courage, longing, or cognitive acts reflected in having wit or good sense in some situation or action, are never in Homer ascribed to the *psyche*. Rather, they are dispersed among (primarily) the *noos*, *thymos*, or *phren/phrenes*, or else are ascribed to one of the other consciousness words most of which designate the "heart."¹⁷

Phren, *noos*, or *thymos* belong to the person in life, are locatable (in the breast), and are tangible as organ-like aspects of bodily existence, especially the *phrenes* (which can entangle on the point of a withdrawn spear) and the *thymos* (sometimes described as concentrated in the *phrenes*). But they are in no way, physically or in their functions, related to a person's *psyche*. Emphatically, they are not faculties of the soul or self, as are their linguistic counterparts in Plato's *Republic*¹⁸ and in later faculty psychology. In Homer, *noos*, *thymos*, and *phren* are conceptualized in one

of three basic ways. First, the words may designate physical organs, or organ-like aspects of the body, and, as such, are physically locatable; even *noos*, sometimes claimed to be the least "material" of the early soul words, is fixed by formulas (this in several grammatical cases) as being "in the breast." Second, and not uncommonly, the words may directly designate the functions for which these organs are responsible, but without reference to a locatable organ. Third, the soul words (especially *thymos*) often behave like quasi-personal agents, so that one can exhort one's *thymos*, or consult it, or be emboldened by its response, or even act without its consent, as on one occasion Zeus does (*Il.* 4.43). This tripartite usage is, in some instances, foreign or even bizarre to us; in others it parallels the peculiar features of our (and perhaps all) psychological vocabulary. What deserves notice is that the entire complex, or "psychological territory," covered by such nouns as *noos*, *phren*, *thymos*, etc., performs the same service that, much later, the unitary *psyche* performs for a Socrates, namely, this vocabulary designates the only "bearer of the personality" that Homeric man knows. As a direct result, for Greeks of the Archaic period, it is a personality or "self" which is quite different from the one Socrates or Plato will discover. Equally important, we should note that *noos* or *thymos*—unlike, of course, the *psyche*—dies with the body just as finally does a hand or an eye, which means the human personality is annihilated at death, save in the memories of the living. It should also be observed that, as untidy as this undoubtedly seems, the consciousness words in Homer function in all of the above ways (organ-like, function-like, agent-like), and emphasis on one to the rigid exclusion of others seems unfaithful to Homeric usage.¹⁹

In summary, all feeling or intelligent action or speech, the latter whether spoken or understood, which is to say, the entire affective, cognitive and linguistic life of the person, are ascribed in Homer elsewhere than to *psyche* in life, and they play no part in the shadowy existence of *psyche* after death. Yet, only the *psyche* survives, as unenviable as its existence in Hades, a place bereft of mind or speech or pleasures (as Homer specifies)²⁰ may seem to us and indeed seemed to the early Greeks. Death for them, especially premature death,²¹ was thus never without its sting, and such existence as could be expected after death held no consolations. This psychological and escatological "belief system," as far as the extant literature of Greece is concerned, remained the dominant one for all Hellenes from the earliest alphabetic records, which date to the late eighth century, until fairly late in the fifth century, when Socrates was in his mature years. In that span of two hundred years, the most important contribution to the history of *psyche* belongs, as we have noted, to Heraclitus and his remarkable statements concerning the role *psyche* plays in the mental and linguistic behavior of *living* persons. In order to appreciate where on the spectrum Heraclitus belongs, what he shares (and what he does not) both with Homer and with Socrates, let us briefly examine those salient

features of the Socratic *psyche* which became a permanent Western possession.

The Socratic Psyche

In the seventy years since John Burnet first published (1916)²² his now classic paper, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul," a growing number of scholars have come to support his view that an innovation of major importance occurred in the usages and meaning of *psyche* in the last quarter of the fifth century before Christ, and that Socrates was at the center of this movement. Since philosophical innovation never translates immediately into popular belief, and Socrates' fate implies that his did not, this view would suggest that a majority of Socrates' contemporaries still understood *psyche* in the two Homeric senses of (1) "life" (and so a *psyche* could be risked or lost) and (2) breath/wraith, the life-breath whose function is solely to animate the human body in life and to depart it in death. To those contemporaries, the imperative Socratic demand to tend one's *psyche* or ghost, to give it "therapy" (*therapeia* in the language of the *Apology*) would presumably sound rather peculiar, as indeed the puns and plays on *psyche* in the *Clouds*,²³ a play satirical of Socrates, and even in the *Birds* (once concerning *psyche* and also alluding to Socrates), would seem to confirm. Burnet (with some variations and reservations which do not concern the argument of this paper) in essence drew this conclusion, stressing quite rightly that neither of the contemporary meanings above described the *psyche* of which Socrates spoke.

If we were to accept such a reconstruction as being approximately correct, we would conclude next that those few of Socrates' contemporaries who did not share the majority (and still essentially Homeric or traditional) beliefs about *psyche* would, in the main, be sectarians whose views of *psyche* were not destined for a long or important life, as for example the inscribers of the fifth century tomb inscriptions, found in this century at Athens and elsewhere in Attica, which describe a *psyche* as departing at death for the upper *aither*. Such sectarian views (including Pythagorean and Orphic) cannot, in any case, be documented for a period earlier than the late fifth century, when, of course, Socrates was alive. The latter fact is also true for the philosopher Democritus, who had some non-traditional things to say about soul; he was Socrates' younger contemporary. Diogenes may be somewhat earlier, and he specified air as that which sustains men and animals, identifying it with soul (*fr.* 4), but he seems to have had no popular following (allowing, however, for the possibility that *Clouds* may in part be satirical of him). No other Presocratic philosopher shows any particular interest in *psyche*, at least by that name; the word does not appear in the extant remains of Parmenides, and is used conventionally in its few appearances (a total of three) in Empedocles and Anaxagoras. The historical facts then, so this reconstruction goes, seem clear: if Socrates was not the

sole originator of all aspects of a new philosophical concept of *psyche* (it is sometimes overlooked that Burnet conceded this), at least he first integrated its several parts into a single concept, and made the publicizing of it central to his life's task. Moreover, it was to be his concept of *psyche*—not sectarian ones, and, later, not those of Aristotle or the Stoics—which was destined to be stamped on the European consciousness. This may be regarded as the Burnet Hypothesis in a somewhat revised or weakened form, and in this form seems both substantially correct and historically important.

The major conclusion concerning *psyche* to be drawn from this reconstruction would then be along these lines. Due primarily, but not exclusively, to the thought and activity of Socrates, some Greeks began to use *psyche* to designate what may be called a conscious, feeling, thinking, moral, autonomous self, the source in the human person of cognition and of moral decision, of personal feelings and of memory, that in a person to which it makes sense to impute praise or blame for the decisions and actions which belong most characteristically to man as man.²⁴ This Socratic *psyche* thus becomes the "core" of the human personality, and as such, is ontologically unique and morally beyond price. When I tend this *psyche*, emphatically I am tending what is most importantly "me"; and I am in those moments not serving the wants or needs of my body, or my ambitions to be publicly praised in the community, or to acquire wealth, things which Socrates in the *Apology*²⁵ implies that most Athenians put before care for the soul. Nor, it should be noted, am I transferring moral responsibility for any of my actions to some quasi-personal agent, a *thymos* or *phren*, which when swayed by powerful outside forces or deities becomes in essence "not-me."

This much concerning *psyche* is implied by (especially) certain passages in the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*; it finds indirect confirmation in a number of early dialogues (notably the *Charmides*)²⁶ and in its emphases and contrasts goes well beyond Heraclitus or any earlier Greek thinker. But the Socratic emphasis did not stop there if we can accept the evidence of those same early dialogues, notably the *Euthyphro*. For more important than Socrates' complaint about his fellow Athenians' greed or ambition (presumably to be found in any community and hardly a central issue in the dialogues) was his insistent complaint, dramatized in dialogue after dialogue and summarized in the *Apology*, that they did not give thought to the activity of thinking *per se*, and so they never brought the *psyche* into the best state or condition possible for it, thus not making it as excellent or efficient as possible. For this to occur, the *psyche* must come to know objects of a special kind, finally called Forms, or meanings in definitions, *logoi* (it should be noted that the distinction between an entity and a meaning, or the question of their convertibility, is not at issue in the early dialogues). These objects are "apart" at least in the sense of being radically distinct from the many actions which are, at most, instances or examples of them. These ob-

jects also demand a peculiar *logos*, a fixed and timeless definition, which is not a particularized or narrativized description of an instance or an action. Therefore, there are some stern cognitive and linguistic rules to be followed, or conditions to be met, in a Socratic encounter. In the language of the *Euthyphro* passages,²⁷ each of these objects is a one (*tis mia idea*), whereas actions and instances are many; each remains the "same, itself to itself," whereas actions happen and instances come and go; thus, each of these objects can serve as a model (*paradeigma*) by which to judge particular examples. The cognitive and linguistic requirements embodied in the insistent Socratic demand for such discourse were, for the late fifth century, as radical and revolutionary as they were unfamiliar and puzzling to Socrates' many interlocutors. The Socratic *psyche* has, therefore, as its specific and supreme task to discover and describe properly such objects as piety "just in itself," or *per se*, and so, too, justice and goodness and beauty and courage and the other "itselfes" and to provide for each of them the proper *logos*. Or to alter the emphasis slightly, such activity is preeminently a task of the Socratic soul, every bit as important to it, if not more so, as its function as the originator in the person of moral or immoral actions and choices, or the appropriate receptacle of moral praise or blame.

Socrates in the *Phaedo* claims that the discovery of such objects in *logoi*, or postulating them as *logoi/causes* to be examined as entailed by more ultimate *logoi*, was his *deuteros plous* or "second voyage" after he had abandoned the investigations of Ionic science as a futile endeavor.²⁸ The statement may contain a kernel of historical truth, confirming what we find in the dialogues and, as well, in Aristotle's testimony of what was distinctive of Socrates. Also Socratic, it would seem, was a rudimentary theory of knowledge which is entailed by his distinctive method. If there is a proper account (*logos*) for each "X itself," Piety, Justice, and the rest, and only one, these to be discovered by dialectical inspection, then the ability to frame such a *logos* is what having knowledge of X means. Since this alone would constitute knowledge, the claim to knowledge by interlocutors who cannot perform this cognitive and linguistic task in the manner prescribed by Socrates becomes a major polemical thrust of the early dialogues, usually launching the discussion itself. A notable but typical example is the extravagant and even bizarre claim of Euthyphro to know very precisely (*akribos*, a strong adverb) about matters of piety; hence, he can prosecute his own father for impiety, itself by contemporary Athenian standards a grievously impious act.²⁹

The *Phaedo* asserts that for the mental task of discovering this object (or "meaning," the metaphysics need not concern us here) the *psyche* itself must, in related language, become "integrated" or "apart" or "itself by itself."³⁰ Such language can have an ascetic cast in the *Phaedo*, reflecting its emphasis on the separation of body and soul, but in the *Republic* this suggestion is elaborated into the demand that a tripartite *psyche* be, or become,

healthy, each part doing its own, an integrated self which is then (Platonically) "just." In the *Republic*³¹ and *Ion*,³² the irrational but highly pleasurable activity of identifying with recited and sung poetry, a psychological identification to which Plato gives the name *mimesis* or "imitation," is singled out as being especially destructive and dangerous to the integration and balance of the contemporary Greek *psyche*, impairing its health, and so inhibiting or even "crippling" its proper or highest activity, *phronein* or "to think." One is tempted to recall Heraclitus' castigation of Homer and the poets, and of *anthropoi* who love to listen to wandering reciters and singers and follow after them, even though the terms of the earlier polemic were far less sophisticated than Plato's. In any case, for Socrates in all these dialogues, the proper discipline of *psyche*, mainly but not exclusively cognitive (for it does also have a moral and even ascetic dimension), emerges as life's major undertaking; it is discovered or practiced in dialectical exercises governed by precise and demanding cognitive and linguistic rules which, in turn, are portrayed in the dialogues as unfamiliar and often irksome to most contemporary Athenians (as, indeed, they are to Euthyphro), and the sought after *logos* is thus never found. By long tradition, this group of Socratic dialogues has come to be known as aporetic, or inconclusive, and in them seemingly the interlocutors depart empty-handed. But Socrates, at least, persists in his almost relentless pursuit of the proper *logos* for moral terms as an exercise or therapy of soul, at work at it in dialogue after dialogue.

This total view of the *psyche*, at least as a completed concept, or perhaps a set of interrelated concepts, can be found in no earlier Greek thinker than Socrates, and can be documented for the first time in the early and early-middle dialogues of Plato. Nothing as yet has been said about immateriality or immortality because little is directly said about them before the *Phaedo*; moreover, as philosophical issues, they can be separated from the view of *psyche* or self described above, a separation often *de facto* accomplished in the Platonic dialogues before the *Phaedo* and also widely effected in psychological discussion in our own day. In the *Phaedo* what might be called the ontological status of *psyche*, in both this life and the afterlife, emerges as a formal concern for the first time in the Platonic corpus, corresponding to the new concern for the ontological status of the *auto to eidos* (where for *eidos* could be substituted *agathos*, *kalos*, *dikaios*, etc.) as radically "separate" from, as well as "distinct" from (*choris/chorismos* carry both meanings), particular instances and actions, and now clearly recognized as a (Platonic) Form. In the *Phaedo*, the individual *psyche* is explicitly included in the important class of things which, like Forms, are most real, but are "unseen." Even so, and indeed because of its membership in that privileged class, the individual *psyche* is of sufficient substantiality and immateriality to be arguably immortal. Although the immortality of the *psyche* seems not to have been the gravamen of the Socratic message (as

Burnet rightly perceived), it was probably Socrates' personal conviction, whether original or derived. But in the Socratic dialogues priority belongs to the concept of the *psyche* as the bearer of the human personality, and (as Heraclitus first distantly intuited), above all, as the "thinking self."

The final Socratic conclusion (and Homeric paradox) from such a belief would be that physical death need no longer, as for a young Elpenor, constitute the final human disaster. But this, I stress, is the case precisely because of the quality of the Socratic soul which survives death, and it is that quality of *psyche* which was his major concern; once again, it differs radically from the Homeric *psyche* (which of course also survived death) in being the bearer of the personality. This inversion of Homeric belief carries the potential implication that death can become the final assuagement for human ills, a release for the true self, the soul's final cure, a healing. As such, death could conceivably become, for those who had properly tended the *psyche* in life, not an end to all life worth having, but something like a departure on the journey home. This too, sounding so Pythagorean, was probably a genuine Socratic belief, but does not seem to have been an important thrust of at least his daily teaching and indeed is reserved by Plato mainly for his death scene. Such a reconstruction affords the best explanation for Socrates' otherwise enigmatic last words in that famous scene from the *Phaedo*,³³ preeminently the dialogue on *psyche* and death. In the process of dying and as his final earthly act, Socrates turns to his wealthy friend Crito and remarks that he, Socrates, a man otherwise scrupulous in matters of obligation, has somehow incurred a debt that he cannot now personally discharge. The debt is to the god Asclepius; will Crito on behalf of Socrates pay it by offering a small bird of sacrifice, traditionally the poor man's gift to the god in return for a favor done? As Crito replies that of course he will do this final favor for the friend of his youth, Plato's readers are surely meant to recall that Asclepius was the god of healing.

The fact that these ideas or some variation of them have become familiar by reason of their acceptance by subsequent centuries of believers (perhaps inverting for religious reasons what was the core of the Socratic message about *psyche* and what was personal belief following upon it) should not blind us to their originality at the time Socrates first elaborated them. By his own admission, or at least in the admission which Plato puts in his mouth at the supreme crisis of his life, Socrates was a man with a message, the heart of which was the imperative human need to tend what is most precious in us, the autonomous *psyche*, and bring it into its best condition, so that it thinks and feels and chooses rightly. Clearly, that admonition would have been unintelligible to Homeric man, and seems yet to have sounded peculiar if not vaguely seditious to many of those who heard Socrates make it, as Burnet rightly observed so many years ago. But it was this concept of *psyche*, largely through Christianity, that the West inherited, so that today the Socratic admonition (without the metaphysics)

seems to us no more than what any reflective, introspective moral person always does.

With that much conceded to Socratic-Platonic originality, let us mention a caveat. In its totality, the concept, or set of concepts, relating to *psyche* is indeed highly original; but in its parts it is less so, and whereas they deserve to be investigated separately, that is a task which cannot be undertaken here. I am here concerned only to locate the first non-Homeric usages of *psyche* in the surviving Greek literature which attribute to a *psyche* some activities and functions associated with cognition and/or intelligent speech, or which involve *psyche* with some morally weighted choices; and such are to be found first not in the text of Plato, but in the fragments of Heraclitus. Since this fact alone would earn for Heraclitus an important place in the history of European philosophy and psychology, an exploration of some important psychological usages of *psyche* in the surviving fragments would seem appropriate in a volume devoted to the philosophical conception of "soul."

Heraclitus: The Genuine Psyche Fragments

Before turning to the three psychological fragments which are the primary focus of this paper, all the genuine *psyche* fragments are translated below for the reader's convenience, and those not included as genuine are briefly noted. The genuine *psyche* sayings fall into three categories: (1) *psyche* and *logos*, (2) *psyche* in better or worse states, and (3) *psyche* and death.

Category I: *Psyche* and *Logos*

The limits of *psyche* you will not find even if you set off on every route, so deep a *logos* does it have. (B45)

Psyche has a *logos* which augments itself. (B115)

Category II: *Psyche* in Better or Worse States

In five fragments the *psychai* of the living are said to be better or worse off, which condition in turn affects human action. In three, a physiological dimension for *psyche* is added in terms of wet (worse)/dry (better).

Worthless witnesses to men are eyes and ears, if their *psychai* are barbarous. (B107)

It is hard to fight against desire; for it purchases what it wants at the price of *psyche*. (B85)

A man when he is drunk is led by a mere boy, having his *psyche* wet. (B117)

Dry *psyche* is most efficient and best. (B118)

To *psychai* it is death to become water;
to water it is death to become earth.

Yet from earth comes water;
from water, *psyche*. (B36)

Category III: *Psyche* and Death

One genuine fragment concerns the afterlife, but it may be either serious or satirical, and so invites alternative translations.

Psychai have the sense of smell in Hades. (B98)

Those [Homeric] *psychai* sniff about in Hades! (B98)

In addition, several fragments printed by Diels as genuine require mention. B136 is a late hexameter, rightly rejected by Marcovich (M.96b), but it has been much discussed: "*Psychai* of men slain in battle are purer than those who die of disease." Marcovich also rejects B77, considering it a derivation of B118: "It is delight to souls to become watery." Nothing in the language or style of B77 requires rejection, and it may well be genuine (so Bywater and others maintain); but genuine or not, it adds little to the sentiments expressed by other fragments in Category II.

Of far greater consequence for Heraclitean studies, Diels³⁴ printed as genuine a clause (beginning with *kai*) appended in Arius Didymus to the genuine B12, the famous River Statement, which appendage asserts that souls arise from rivers by "exhalation." The word, whether as in Arius a verb (*anathumiontai*), or as a noun (*anathumiasis*), could hardly have appeared in Heraclitus, and indeed, in the *ana*-compounds the word does not occur earlier than Aristotle. Nevertheless, many editors following Diels print the *kai* clause as genuine; that fact alone has generated a modern literature on soul "exhalations" in Heraclitus which is formidable. Kirk³⁵ argued decisively that for B12 the genuine quotation ends with *hydata epirrei*, that is, before the appended *kai* clause, which, in my judgment, is a stylistic certainty. If accepted, this removes any explicit reference to soul exhalation from the genuine fragments, leaving as a source for such a doctrine either a strained interpretation of some other genuine fragment (e.g., B36), a problematical comment in Aristotle's *De Anima*,³⁶ or a questionable doxographical tradition often with Stoic accretions. Notably, Cleanthes in reporting Zeno's views on soul observes that the master held that the soul was a "percipient exhalation" (*aisthetiken anathumiasin*).³⁷

The awkward appendage in Arius Didymus to the elegant River Statement was transparently an attempt by Cleanthes to import an exhalation theory of soul into Heraclitus, thus affording another proof-text for the Stoic belief. The very clumsiness of this attempt is strong indirect evidence that the collection known to Cleanthes contained no such theory, for if there had been anything else in the collection to quote, or even to cling to, we can be sure that Cleanthes and the other Stoics would have made capital of it. Admittedly, any argument *ex silentio* has its limitations, but this one seems unusually strong. Arius himself records Cleanthes' habit of quoting the views of the master side-by-side with those of other famous thinkers, and of course above all Heraclitus, as some kind of confirmation of Zeno's doctrine. In any case, what the philosopher did say explicitly about "ex-

halation" (and whether it involved *psyche*) has not survived. Aristotle converts whatever he may have said into his own vocabulary of *arche* and *anathumiasis*, and the Stoics seem mainly to have invented. That does not leave us much on which to build an exhalation theory of the physiology of soul.

The first point to note about the genuine *psyche* fragments collected above is that the departure from Homeric usage is radical, and of major significance from the standpoint of the history of psychology. The only usage of *psyche* which could also occur in Homer is the single fragment in Category III, B98, a fact which may lend support to the view that the fragment is satirical and part of the Heraclitean polemic with Homer, as persuasively argued by Professor Martha Nussbaum.³⁸ Her interpretation is to the effect: stupid *anthropoi* still believe in a Homeric *psyche* which, if blind in Hades, must presumably find its way about by sniffing. Absurd!

If B98 is rightly interpreted as satirical, then it accords well with B27 which states that men after death will find what they do not expect or even imagine; Greeks certainly expected to have their *psyche* go down to Hades, and for it there to be blind. Lending support to the satirical view of B98 are two linguistic items: (1) the article can have demonstrative force in Homeric dialect (hence, "Those *psychai*") and (2) the strong tendency for Heraclitus to omit the article where possible, especially in very short sayings with noun subjects. Its presence in B98 therefore invites comment, especially when, by omitting it, the saying would have been even more terse.

The second and equally important point to stress about the Heraclitean *psyche* collection is that neither is this radically non-Homeric *psyche* as yet the immaterial, immortal unitary *psyche* of Plato's *Phaedo*, that *choristos nous* which, preeminently, is the autonomous human self and whose primary function it is to know the *chorista*, the separated *noeta eide* which Plato (at least) called Forms. However, especially for the fragments in Category I, if the psychological interpretation offered below is correct, some first and very significant steps were being taken in that direction by Heraclitus.

The Psychai of Anthropoi as Barbarous: B107

This paper, for reasons of space, is restricted to a discussion of those genuine fragments which, *eo nomine*, discuss *psyche* in connection with *logos*. I include in that discussion, however, the important B107 in which *anthropoi*, most Hellenes, are faulted for failing to understand, or properly to comprehend, a *logos*, a discourse, although the word itself does not appear. However, the adjective *barbaros* does appear, modifying *psyche*, and this (in my opinion) makes an allusion to the hearing of a *logos* in B107 a certainty.

Heraclitean scholars have gradually acknowledged that *barbaros* must be interpreted along some such lines as the old Skeptical version of the frag-

ment (a condemnation of sense knowledge) has, perhaps reluctantly, been abandoned. Diels himself initiated this necessary revision, but what has become, following him, the standard interpretation is not as yet totally free from the legacy of the Skeptical bias. In any case, if B107 is correctly interpreted below, and it marks the first instance in Greek literature of rational powers being attributed to a *psyche*, then a psychological interpretation for the two other *logos/psyche* fragments treated next in this paper gains in credibility. Therefore, B107 will be discussed first, and at some length.

Worthless witnesses to men are eyes and ears
if they have barbarous souls (*barbarous psychas*).

The participle in the second colon (*echonton*) with *anthropoisi*, the manuscript reading, reflects Homeric usage (nine examples have been adduced)³⁹ and therefore should not be emended. The Ephesian audience knew the Homeric poems by heart and the construction, lending the words a slight epic flavor, was both intelligible and grammatical to them. Also, it reinforces the Homeric quality of the scene which is being evoked: oral swearing or attesting, familiar enough in Homer and in any protoliterate society. The Heraclitean shock is reserved (typically) for the end, the noun and adjective of the second colon, a new and revolutionary use of *psyche* because modified by the adjective *barbaros*. As Kahn⁴⁰ notes, this "is the first time in extant literature that the word *psyche* 'soul' is used for the power of rational thought." Heraclitus in B107, as elsewhere in the collection, is a conceptual and linguistic innovator. There is no reason to believe that *psyche* had previously been endowed with significant cognitive powers in some lost text of an earlier lyric poet, or that the integrated personality, as often asserted, had somehow been discovered earlier in Sappho, Archilochus, Callinus, or whomever (singly or collectively). The usages of the soul words in the so-called lyric poets remain, with rare exception, traditional, which is to say, Homeric.⁴¹ The innovator is Heraclitus.

Recent scholarship, pioneered by Snell, has correctly recognized the importance of this saying for the semantic history of *psyche*, but the saying has not always been so assessed. The problem has been that the fragment has been more clouded and obscured by the context in which it was first quoted (by Sextus Empiricus) than perhaps any other in the collection. Sextus precedes his quotation by a sentence which claims that Heraclitus is among those who cast discredit on the senses, and follows it with a sentence which asserts that what had just been quoted from Heraclitus is "equivalent to saying that it is the part of (only) crude souls to trust to the irrational senses."⁴² This context (damning the senses as unreliable) was to prove as seductive to generations of interpreters in antiquity as were some of the Christian contexts in which Saint Clement cites a Presocratic text. The methods are similar: a word or two are taken out of context and made to allude to something never intended by the author; the whole is then ex-

ploited exegetically as a proof-text to support a position never imagined by the author.

First, "eyes" and "ears" are taken to stand for all the senses and so "sense knowledge" or even (for some modern interpreters) "sense data." Next, the striking word *barbaros* is taken out of context and given its later and derived meaning of "crude" "rude," and, finally, the whole is converted into a proof-text for sense skepticism, in effect, refined minds never trust the unreliable senses. The conveniently Skeptical result can be traced in antiquity in Marcovich's⁴³ useful list of secondary citations and paraphrases culminating in Tertullian's linking Heraclitus to the Platonists in rejecting (*damnant*) the senses. A similar Skeptical influence, growing out of the magisterial works of the 19th century, could be traced in modern scholarship.

But how plausible is this? Does any other saying in the collection confirm that Heraclitus had addressed the reliability of the senses as an epistemological problem in the manner of Plato or the Skeptics? Only two are relevant: D-K.101a (Bywater, *fr.* 15) states that eyes are more accurate witnesses than ears, and B55 states that Heraclitus had a marked preference for the things that can be (personally) seen, heard, and learned. Neither seems to be about—or to imply any reservations about—a sense datum; on the contrary, both seem on any interpretation⁴⁴ to be rather epistemologically trusting. Was there then, in Ionia *ca.* 500 B.C., a more natural way to understand this saying than by (1) taking eyes and ears as a concrete reference to all sense experience, and (2) converting the result into a banal caution about not trusting sensory signals if the mental receptor (*psyche*) is faulty? This, following Diels,⁴⁵ has become the standard interpretation of B107, and admittedly is preferable to the Skeptical version, but it too, I suggest, is still very wide of the mark. Let us examine how this interpretation evolved, and attempt to explore the reasoning and assumptions behind it.

First, the glaring difficulty in the Skeptics' manipulation of B107 was exposed by Diels himself. Nothing is said about faulty *senses* in B107; what is faulted (or found wanting) is the *psyche*, this in a clause which, grammatically, is either causal or conditional (the latter, as Diels argued, being probable), i.e., eyes and ears make worthless witnesses for a person if that person has a barbarous *psyche*. The primary exegetical task should be how to understand the adjective *barbaros*, and then to ask why being in such a state makes one a poor witness, and a witness to what.

Diels, and those who have followed him, suggest a metaphorical interpretation for "eyes," "ears," and *barbaros* which, while ingenious, has served to obscure the philosophical thrust of the fragment every bit as much as did Sextus. Diels, of course, knew that *barbaros* was not a pejorative term⁴⁶ when Heraclitus wrote; someone who was *barbaros* simply did not speak or understand the Greek language, in effect, a foreigner. The next step was to deduce that, for an imagination as rich and poetic as that of

Heraclitus, a *psyche* which was barbarous could, metaphorically, be a *psyche* which did not understand or speak *some* language, but not necessarily the Greek language. Next, again metaphorically, the senses are commonly said to speak a kind of "language" by sending messages or signals or stimuli to the brain; but it should be asked, was that the case *ca.* 500 B.C. in Greece? Behind this interpretation seems to lurk the nineteenth century view of sense impressions as signals-to-the-brain, a theory of perception which the metaphor "language of the senses" requires. Last, by a blending these two metaphors, the barbarous *psyche* of Heraclitus became, for those who followed Diels, one which did not correctly read or interpret the "language" (= sensory messages) sent to it by the five senses, eyes and ears being poetically concrete for all the senses, yet another metaphor.

This involuted interpretation gained rapid and wide acceptance,⁴⁷ perhaps because in the philosophical literature of the early part of this century sensory impressions or "messages" had (following Russell) a certain vogue as "sense data"—which term at least had the merit of sounding less telegraphic than the nineteenth century phrase "sensory signals." But if we permit "eyes" and "ears" in B107 to mean something like sense data, or even sense experience, we have an immediate problem. The saying, on this admittedly ingenious reading, collapses into the banal: sensory signals, like any signals, can be misleading when received by a faulty receptor. Some formidable scholarship, and much imagination, seem to have conspired to give birth to an exegetical mouse. Heraclitus, we rightly feel, can do better than this.

Despite some uneasiness at the paltry result,⁴⁸ this interpretation has yet to be widely replaced in Heraclitean scholarship, as it obviously deserves to be if an interpretation which exploits fewer modern assumptions (and fewer metaphors) can be found. But first, in fairness to it, and in recognition of what gives it some of its staying power, it should be noted that it is a very large step in the right direction in two regards. It insists, as the fragment clearly states, that (1) the senses are not being impugned, but some *psychai*, and (2) *barbaros* retain its force as a linguistic term (if only by strained metaphor). As a result, for the first time a *psyche* (not the *phren* or *noos*) is treated as something of cognitive importance in the activity of living persons—this by understanding, or failing to understand, a language (if only "the language of the senses")—and thereby the word is launched on a long semantic and philosophical journey which has not yet been completed.

Is there a way to interpret the saying which retains the clear advantages without the primary deficit of multiplying metaphors needlessly? To be sure, "eyes" and "ears" are concrete terms, but do they here stand for sense data being transmitted to a *psyche* somehow grown poorly equipped to handle the flood of messages? Is the inability to understand the Greek language likely, in the city of Ephesus when Heraclitus lived, to be metaphorical for a garbling of sensory signals or data? If "eyes" and

"ears" are indeed metaphorical symbols, then evidence for understanding the symbolic reference should be sought independently of B107 in the fragments of Heraclitus, or in the extant Ionic prose closest to his time, which, in any quantity, is, of course, that of Herodotus. Such evidence exists, and it leads directly to a natural and obvious interpretation very much in congruence with a large number of the fragments in the collection. On the interpretation offered below, B107 is a continuation of the philosopher's polemic with *anthropoi* who fail to comprehend the discourse which Heraclitus urgently commends, a *logos*.

When the metaphors have been scrapped, what is left in B107 is that a scene is being verbally evoked, a sharp memorable picture, as in so many of the sayings, e.g., "Every beast with blows is pastured" (B11). Its contours are as follows. An issue is being disputed, probably in the *agora*, the meeting place of an Ionian township. It is a legal case, hence professional witnesses are present; but the evidence and proceedings are not being properly assessed by these worthies because the supposed experts, while present and listening, operate under a crippling deficiency, a linguistic handicap: they cannot understand the language of the proceedings, Greek.

The scene thus collapses into absurdity (which Heraclitus holds back and then lets wash over the listener) as the conditional clause is pronounced and the saying ends, strongly suggesting satire on the part of the author, even burlesque. But the basic situation behind the image is serious enough, one of oral witnessing, a favorite of Heraclitus (B34, 107, 118, 101a) and familiar to his contemporaries; B104, I suggest, has nothing to do with telegraphing or sending messages. This may also give added point to the slightly archaic syntax noted above; the scene, the mood, the tone, as it were, is Homeric and oral. Protoliterate life is, in fact, filled with oral attesting to facts and events, a process both common and vital in a society in which documentation has not as yet assumed the burden for warranting and protecting veracity. In Heraclitus' Ephesus, one did not habitually "get it in writing." One summoned a witness, preferably more than one. Were we more accustomed to the ancient need for accurate witnessing to what has been orally sworn (e.g., eyewitnessing: the witness of "eyes" or being present), and to the need for attesting, in later dispute, to what had been said (hearsay: the witness of "ears," i.e., hear and say), then we might more readily recognize and appreciate a reference to the absurdity of witnesses who cannot follow the language of a formal proceeding (*barbaros* in the only sense fifth century Ionic prose knew).

That witnessing is what is being evoked by "eyes" and "ears" (the terms were proverbial for it in Ionic dialect; see below) has been recognized by one scholar⁴⁹ for the related D-K 101a: "Eyes (are) more accurate witnesses than ears." The thrust of this terse statement is not that visual signals are sharper or more accurate or reliable than auditory signals, as literate exegetes even in late antiquity, and nearly all modern philosophical

historians, have taken it. The epistemological superiority of one kind of sense knowledge to another is not that visual signals are sharper or more accurate or reliable than auditory signals, as literate exegetes even in late antiquity, and nearly all modern philosophical historians, have taken it. The epistemological superiority of one kind of sense knowledge to another is not at issue, but rather the superiority of one kind of witness over another in an oral society. Seeing and hearing for oneself (eyewitness: being present) is always best, and the report of an eyewitness (only hearing: hearsay) second to it; repeated hearsay is a poor third. Perceptively, Kahn interprets D-K 101a: "Eyes, i.e., direct experience" and "ears, i.e., hearsay."

Kahn also notes that a preference for eyes over ears has a proverbial ring, as in the Gyges story (Herod. I, 8.2). That passage, often misunderstood, strongly supports the interpretation of B107 adopted in this paper, and so deserves comment. King Candaules is unconvinced that Gyges, favorite among his bodyguards, believes the King's boast that his wife is indeed the most beautiful of women. To prove his contention, the foolish King arranges for Gyges secretly to watch the unsuspecting wife while she undresses for bed, thus to witness for himself the beauty of the naked Queen. For, as the King remarks to a discomfited Gyges (the syntax implies a popular saying), men trust their ears (*ota* = hearsay) less than their eyes (*opthalamon* = eyewitness). Nothing is here being said or implied about the epistemological superiority of one kind of sensory stimulus to another. Herodotus himself extended this popular usage into the distinctions for his own sources of knowledge in historical investigation: eyewitness (*opsis*), hearsay (*akoe*), both to be tested by further vigorous personal investigation and inquiry, the distinctively Ionic *historie* known already to Hecataeus and perhaps to the Milesian philosophers (Herod. II, 19, 44, 75).

In summary, on this interpretation, an Ephesian audience would most naturally take "eyes" and "ears" in the first colon of B107 as referring not to the "sense data" or sensory signals of later philosophers, but (as elsewhere in the sayings) to eyewitnessing, that is, being both personally present and hearing, thus being able later to stand forth and attest to what was said in some oral proceeding. But these *martures* are *kakoi*, a strongly pejorative word for Heraclitus, and the only pejorative word in the saying. They are untrustworthy, worthless as witnesses. Why? In the interpretation here offered, the meaning of *barbaros* need not be metaphorically tortured; the word means what it always meant in archaic Ionic, someone who does not speak or understand Greek. A witness is *kakos* if dishonest, of course, but also not a good *qua* witness if he cannot comprehend what is being said. In a sharp polemical image, stupid *anthropoi* are cast in the role of ridiculous professional witnesses: they are present, they are hearing, they have a serious duty, but are not comprehending, *kakoi martures*! What *anthropos* with a barbarous *psyche* hears but does not comprehend is a *logos*,

a discourse, presumably that of the sort Heraclitus speaks and commends (a departure from the *logoi* they love to hear, B108), as well as, of the sort that in the cosmos "ever is" but of which *anthropoi* prove (ever) noncomprehending (B1, *passim*). The proper activity of Heraclitus' *psyche*, clearly, is cognitive and linguistic, and in both areas what he extols is a departure from contemporary Greek habit.

Now the saying can be seen in relation to others in the collection. In a similar manner, *anthropoi* are vilified in another of the "witness" sayings, B34:

Noncomprehending even after they have heard
they are like the deaf
to them witnesses (*marturei*) the saying
present, yet absent.

The verb in line 3 (cognate with *martures*) again evokes the familiar Heraclitean image of oral attesting. In this case, the saying itself stands as witness to the truth of the facts, that is, attests to the fact that *anthropoi* have heard (the *logos*? Heraclitus?) but have not understood; like the deaf at oral proceedings, they were present yet absent. This saying, like B107, comprises part of Heraclitus' continuing polemic with *anthropoi* who have serious deficiencies in their cognitive and linguistic behavior. As Edward Hussey⁵⁰ rightly observed, a large number of Heraclitean sayings (his citations could be greatly expanded) are polemical, aimed at "most Greeks" or *anthropoi* (I would add, often in an area we would broadly designate "epistemological"). Hussey writes of *anthropoi*:

They are compared to sleepers in private worlds of their own (*ffr.* 1, 2.73); to children who believe what their parents tell them (*fr.* 74; cf. 79); to dogs who bark at strangers (*fr.* 97); to deaf men 'as good as not there' (*fr.* 34); to idiots who take fright at any sensible utterance (*fr.* 87). Their opinions are toys with which they childishly amuse themselves (*fr.* 70).

If the above has been correct, *anthropoi* in B107 are also compared to linguistically impaired professional witnesses to an oral dispute, a marvelous polemical image worthy of Heraclitus, as a pedestrian caution about accurate sense signals being garbled by a faulty receptor is not.

Finally, can we perhaps sharpen the image contained in B107 by exploring an aspect of the contemporary Ephesian situation which may have inspired its observant author? What, immediately, would come to mind in contemporary Ephesus if someone referred to a person witnessing to an event involving both actions and words, but who was *barbaros*, i.e., a foreigner (non-Ephesian) who was unable to understand Greek? I propose, as a probable candidate, the Persian *magoi* witnessing a religious ceremony, a sacrifice, conducted in a Greek temple. In all occupied territories (the law covered even the Jews) governed by the Achaemenid chancellories a law was enforced requiring that a *magos*, a religious official, be present at every

religious sacrifice of whatever kind, although only as a silent observer (except at a Persian sacrifice, where he chanted some kind of theogony, as Herodotus⁵¹ reports). Given the sheer number of *magoi* who would have been needed in the vast occupied territories to serve this purpose, presumably they often were not bilingual? But that did not matter; neither speaking nor understanding was required, only presence. If they were present at a Greek sacrifice, listening and witnessing but noncomprehending because they knew no Greek, then these *magoi* would, in the literal Greek sense, be professional witnesses who are *barbaroi*. Ephesus was, of course, subject to Persian rule for the entire period of Heraclitus' life and, as a hereditary prince-priest of the Artemisium, he must have encountered the practice almost daily. Did it stimulate his artist's imagination? An exotically robed observer dutifully and solemnly witnessing to a strange rite, the very language of which was unintelligible to him? Did proud *anthropoi*, the citizens of Ephesus, listen to the Heraclitean *logos* with equally barbarous souls?

Whatever the case with the *magoi* (and Heraclitus refers to them once, in the corrupt B34), the interpretation offered above, which removes from B107 all allusion to sense experience, or signaling, in favor of evoking a contemporary scene of oral witnessing, a linguistic phenomenon, is, I note, in full accord with the recent remarks (with varying emphases) of Havelock, Nussbaum, Kahn, Hussey, Claus,⁵² and (increasingly) others who have recognized the importance that the correct use of language plays in the sayings of Heraclitus. It is an emphasis which begins in philosophy with him, and which deserves further attention from Heraclitean scholars.

The Logos of Psyche as Deep: B45

Two sayings in the collection ascribe to the *psyche* of the living person a *logos*, already a word of diverse meanings in the Greek spoken ca. 500 B.C., and (I suggest) deliberately polysemous in both sayings. B115 asserts as tersely as possible (in Greek by one syllable) that the *logos* of *psyche* is self-augmenting. B45, the longer and more important saying, asserts that the *logos* of *psyche* is "deep" (*bathus*), offered as the explanation for the fact that the outermost boundaries or limits of *psyche* can never be reached.

Since, in the primary source for B45, the fragment is quoted with a reference to B3, a part hexameter which claims that the sun is only as "wide as a human foot," some earlier scholars interpreted B45 as asserting the opposite, i.e., as opposed to such a narrow compass the limits of *psyche* are "infinite." This now has been rejected by a majority of scholars, as it deserves to be; juxtaposition in Diogenes Laertius is of no significance, and B3 is dubiously genuine, probably deriving from a Hellenistic collection of the sayings in hexameters. Nevertheless, the term "infinite" has lingered in some modern discussions of the saying,⁵³ perhaps influenced by the appearance in the genuine saying of the striking word *peirata* (cognate with a

later word meaning "infinite"), which fact has obscured many interpretations.

What the saying clearly asserts is that the *psyche* does have limits or boundaries (*peirata*, the word and the image it evokes are epical), but that no mortal can reach them no matter the route (*hodos*, another epical word and image) that he takes, or how many he takes, so deep is the *logos* of *psyche*. It is that assertion, in each of its parts, and as heard by a contemporary Ephesian audience, which requires explanation and interpretation. Finally, I will defend a psychological interpretation for both B45 and B115, but I will subjoin to my exposition a brief notice of some physiological interpretations of the sort offered by many scholars, in part because they are common, but also in the hope that by contrast the interpretation offered here will emerge as the least contrived or forced. First, B45:

The boundaries (*peirata*) of *psyche* you will not reach, though you set off on every route (*hodon*), so deep (*bathus*) a *logos* does it have.

The Homeric words *peirata* and *hodos* evoke, first, the image of a long journey in the form of a quest conducted along a specific route, or else one wanders helplessly on the vast seas over which the journey is imagined to take place.⁵⁴ The proper route leading to the *peirata*, the ends or boundaries of the earth, meant to all Greeks a journey to a place magically far away, visited only by deities and (with divine help) by one mortal, Odysseus. More specifically, *peirata* linked with *bathus* evokes Okeanos, the great fresh water sea which (vaguely in Homer, but more specifically in Hesiod) surrounds earth and so serves as its boundaries (*peirata*). Its regular epithets involve, in fact, a compound in *bath-*, as noted below. In B45, as in so many Heraclitean statements, a sharp (often Homeric) pictorial image is being evoked only to have the pictorial or visual aspect destroyed as one is forced to reflect on the additional meaning(s) of the saying, a methodological feature of many of the sayings recognized early by H. Gomperz.⁵⁵ But the initial visualizable picture in B45 remains unforgettable: one can set off in every direction, attempt every route in crossing the seas, and still not reach the *peirata*, the boundaries of all land and sea masses, where is to be found, in the Homeric phrasing, Okeanos deep-flowing. The exploitation of Homeric associations to commend exploration of the *psyche* is, I suggest, clear, bold, and effective.

The *peirata* were well-known to Heraclitus' audience as, first, a place where are to be found wondrous things, such as the fantastic abode of the Kimmerians on which the sun never shines, the lovely groves of Persephone, the sources of legendary rivers (and all earthly seas, rivers, streams, and springs), and, above all, as the place of entrance to the Underworld and to Hades itself.⁵⁶ Hera, a goddess, can reach the *peirata* "swift as thought" when she decides to visit her banished parents in the Underworld, but, as noted, only one living mortal ever successfully journeyed there, Odysseus,

and Heraclitus' language evokes that famous journey. The locus in our text is the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*.

Odysseus has been told by Circe that, to continue his *nostos* after his long sojourn with her, he must locate the entrance to Hades and there, by creating a pit of animal blood, attract upward the *psychai* of the dead (who will wish to drink of it) until Teiresias, great prophet of Thebes, appears whom the hero must then consult for needful instructions (*Od.* 10.475 ff.). Odysseus protests, quite properly, that never before has a mortal made such a journey and, he asks very sensibly, who then could guide him on such a route, *tauten hodon* (*Od.* 10.501–02). The answer is, only a deity, in this case Circe herself; as it turns out, the crew remain unmoving in the boat and let the North wind take them to the ends of the earth and the *peirata* (*Od.* 10.505 ff.). So the journey is magical and of great distance, but, strictly speaking, possible. When the quest has been accomplished, the Homeric phrasing (speaking of the ship) is:

"She made the boundaries (*peirata*), which are of Okeanos deep-running (*bathurroou*)."⁵¹

It should be noted that several epithets for Okeanos involve orally impressive (in declamation) compounds with *bathus*, thus lending to the wonder: Odysseus is commanded by Circe to beach the ships on the shore of Okeanos *bathudives*, deep-eddying (*Od.* 10.511; *Il.* 21.195); Oceanos is *bathurroou* (*Od.* 11.511), deep-running, onomatopoetic especially (as here) in the genitive, making the hexameter especially memorable as well as acoustically impressive. The effect is unmistakable as the hexameter is pronounced, especially when the noun-participle compounds complete the hexameter with the fifth foot a spondee, rather than the more normal dactyll, thus presenting the ear with four, heavy, long syllables in sequence, —/—/. Such considerations may lend credence to the suggestion that this memorable hexameter was playing through Heraclitus' mind, and a comparison to the journey of Odysseus intended, when he composed his otherwise oblique saying about a person never quite reaching the *peirata* of his own *psyche*, even though he sets out on every route (*hodos*), so deep (*bathus*) a *logos* does it have. In any case, no audience which grew up listening to epic reciters would have missed the associations, linguistic, acoustic, and pictorial.

Several related epical images are thus being manipulated and slightly conflated for the Ephesian imagination in B45: an arduous and wondrous quest whose proper route (conveyed in *hodos*) is over many seas; the goal as the ends of the earth and Okeanos, source of all rivers and seas, these as limits and encircling boundaries (conveyed in *peirata*); and Okeanos itself whose waters run deep as does the *logos* of *psyche* (conveyed in *bathus*). The Homeric images unmistakably imply that the Heraclitean task is what we would call psychological, one of exploring or testing or using *psyche* as

on a prescribed route or in a proper exercise. For Heraclitus, this activity of the *psyche* is primarily an exercise in cognition and in the correct use of language (B107 and the evidence cited above). Many years ago, Burnet⁵⁸ boldly (but correctly) asserted: "the soul was no longer a feeble ghost or shade, but the most real thing of all, and its most important attribute was thought (*gnome*) or wisdom (*to sophon*)."⁵⁹ But does not B45 also suggest that the exploration of the soul has an open-ended quality about it, that is, it may never quite be completed? This is the case because the exercise or exploration of *psyche* "runs deep" and so, therefore, does the measure of it and the telling of it. It ends, we may perhaps assume, only when *psyche* (or life) itself ends.

The image of *hodos* or route to describe a cognitive exercise is fundamentally oral, and was also adopted by Heraclitus' great contemporary Parmenides in his recurrent phrase "the route (*hodos*) of inquiry" (B.6.3; B.7.2; B.8.1) which is prescribed and proscribed in various ways for the *kouros*. The cognitive search/route, it should be noted, is something conducted in speech by both philosophers (even if spoken only to oneself in internal dialogue, as is probable in Heraclitus); a *logos* in the closing years of the sixth century, whatever else it may have been, was primarily a discourse. Thus a deep *logos* is simultaneously a telling, a report, and quite defensibly Kahn translates *logos* in both B45 and B115 as "report"; Lattimore in B45 translates "so deep a tale" does it have. The telling of it is, perforce, as deep as the *psyche* which has been explored and of which the *logos* is the proper linguistic account.

When, as explanation for unattainable boundaries or limits of *psyche*, it is said that the *logos* of the *psyche* is *bathus*, the experienced Heraclitean audience might pause to puzzle over—and perhaps relish—the possible multiple meanings for *logos* here, a favorite Heraclitean device. I suggest that the word may be deliberately polysemous, as follows.

The first, obvious meaning is "measure" already suggested by the "deep-flowing" epithet for Okeanos: so deep a measure ("tally" as reckoning) does it have, a common meaning for *logos* in the fifth century. In many literatures, including Greek, such a meaning becomes proverbial for a task beyond the merely human: e.g., who shall count the stars (or grains of sand) or measure the sea? Many translators so render it, following Burnet, "measure." But equally difficult would be the telling of it, the "tally," as a verbal account of such a journey once it had been undertaken; and finally: "so deep a reason(ing) or cognitive effort does it have or require." This final meaning cannot be ruled out by scholarly dictum on the grounds that only in later Greek did *logos* carry the connotations of "reason," or by the accusation that one is importing Stoic connotations. Parmenides, Heraclitus' philosophical contemporary, has his goddess command the *kouros* to judge with *logos* the argument which she has spoken (B.7.5), where *logos* may imply the meaning "reason" and is often so translated.

(Also, cf. Epicharmus, *fr.* 57, where *logismos* means human calculation and is contrasted to a divine *logos*; Epicharmus flourished *ca.* 480 B.C.)

In addition, I suggest that B45 carries an implied admonition which involves all the above meanings. One is encouraged to take the measure of one's *psyche*, go inwardly in search of its possibilities; one should learn the proper discourse that the correct *hodos* and the telling of it requires; one discovers in this way a deep reasoning, the proper human activity. The saying is positive in that a psychological journey is encouraged even though the final limits may never be reached, or the process exhausted; like Odysseus one must, with full confidence, set sail in the *nostos* is to continue. The difference is that the psychological *hodos* commended by Heraclitus is one which lasts over a lifetime and is still not completed; whereas Odysseus completes his magical journey in a single day. The images and the language may remain Homeric, and the statement itself may seem to us part imagist and part conceptual; but the activity commended in B45, the effort of *psyche* that is extolled, is a radical departure from Homer.

There is an unmistakable polemical tone to the saying as well. *Anthropoi* clearly do not do this, i.e., seek the boundaries of the *psyche* and the deep *logos* thereof, nor learn the proper modes of discourse either of the internal *logos* of *psyche* or of the external *logos* of the cosmos; hence, *anthropos* is noncomprehending, deaf, *barbaros*, *blax*. For Heraclitus, the external cosmic *logos* and the internal personal *logos* of the *psyche* are evidently not totally disjunct, but that issue cannot be developed here. Instead, we turn to the *psyche* as capable of "expanding."

Psyche as Self-Augmenting: B115

The second *psyche* saying which contains the word *logos* is the terse and enigmatic B115:

Psyche has a *logos* which is self-augmenting.

The genuineness of the fragment has been questioned but for no persuasive reason. The terseness is Heraclitean enough, the saying being, by one syllable (perhaps explaining *esti*), as short as Greek syntax permits. The word *auxon* has troubled some scholars, but is common enough in contemporary Ionic prose; in Herodotus it means "grow" and "increase" in both a physical and a metaphorical sense. If the latter is the case in B115, then *logos* is plausibly polysemous once again. Assuming that an expansion or augmenting of *logos* is beneficial rather than detrimental for *psyche* (a safe assumption for Heraclitus), and the improvement is accomplished by self-exploratory, cognitive and linguistic behavior of a sort extolled in B107 and B45, then *logos* can be polysemous as follows.

Psyche has (1) a measure, (2) an account/report, and (3) a reason(ing) which keep increasing or expanding until death provided that the *psyche* practices the sort of activity which Heraclitus commends. What is

remarkable here, and emphasized, is that the *logos* of *psyche* is *self-expanding*, that is, interior to the *psyche* and not imposed from the outside; the mental improvement proceeds from within as a concomitant of self-generated effort and is not cast into the *psyche* (or *noos* or *phren*) from without by some deity, the standard Homeric manner of conceptualizing all mental initiative. The activity which results in the self-augmenting of *logos* is, then, both the self-exploration of the inner cosmos, i.e., one's own mental and speech acts, and the exploration of the *logos* of the external cosmos. Unlike the Homeric *psyche*, the Heraclitean *psyche* can be active in the living person (but *anthropoi* "sleep") which results in the favorable fact that its *logos* (in all three meanings suggested) expands, grows.

If the above psychological interpretations is correct for B115, then two sayings in the collection are plausibly related.

I went in search of myself. (B101)

Man's character is his *daimon*. (B119)

To the contemporary Greek's ear (as to Plutarch's and even to the Emperor Julian's centuries later)⁵⁹ the wording of B101 evokes the Delphic maxim "Know thyself," the most famous of Greek sayings, and may be regarded as a play on it. If so, Heraclitus is again taking a familiar saying and turning it to a new purpose which the original lacked. The Delphic saying may initially have enjoined little more than to know one's limits as being merely human, or even "Know your place," but Heraclitus hardly went in search of ways to conform to contemporary mores and beliefs. Rather, in the light of other *psyche* fragments, Heraclitus more probably meant that, unlike *anthropoi* who are manipulated by influences external to themselves, he turned inwardly somehow, and this was an exercise of the *psyche*. For there he also discovered a *logos*, deep and self-expanding, requiring exploration of an extensive but rather wondrous kind. The break with tradition, even as he exploits traditional material and belief, is evident. It is no less so in the related B119:

Man's character (*ethos*) is his fate (*daimon*).

The emphasis here is on decisive action of the sort whose source is the inner self. The Homeric opposite is action generated from the outside, breathed into the person, or otherwise imposed on him, by a myriad of external forces, gods, and *daimones* whose constant intervention in epic serve to initiate all important human action. The contrast, then, plausibly is between one who explores his *psyche*, who listens to and explores both an internal (psychic) and external (cosmic) *logos*, and Homeric man (*anthropos*) who does neither. Snell, Dodds, Onians, and many others have usefully observed that in epic seldom (if ever) is significant action initiated by any person unless an external supernatural power, a deity, directly affects one of the organs of consciousness. F. M. Cornford,⁶⁰ in his first philosophical

book, argued that the polemic with this view was indeed the thrust of this saying:

When Heraclitus . . . says that a man's character is his *daemon*, he means that it is the force which shapes his life from within, and makes or mars his fortunes, not a 'destiny' allotted him from without.

Finally, I would add, that a neglected play on words is possible in B119, affording the saying dual meanings, depending on whose ears it falls. For the enlightened, their character determines their fate, what they make of themselves, and so for Heraclitus primarily what they make of their *psyche*. For *anthropos*, his social habit (perhaps the best attested meaning of *ethos* in Ionic prose, as in Herodotus) is still his *daimon*: that is, cultural habituation totally controls him and manipulates him.

The Logos of Psyche: Some Physiological Readings

The three *psyche/logos* fragments examined above, for which I have explored a psychological interpretation, have commonly been given a physiological reading, some of astonishing cleverness. In candor, perhaps no interpreter of Heraclitean sayings has been immune from the temptation at times to be overly ingenious; the style invites more than one reading, as Aristotle in frustration (*Rhet.* 1407b13) noted concerning the ambiguous placement of an adverb in B1 (which ambiguity Heraclitus may have intended, as a few scholars have maintained). However, is the obvious perhaps being sacrificed to the recondite if the "depth" (so *bathus* a measure does it have) in B45 is identified with what is "deep" in the organism, i.e., the blood, yielding then Marcovich's (and others') interpretation that the measure (*logos*) of *psyche* is hidden (i.e., not visible) in the blood? The next step is to interpret *peirata* as a metaphor for birth (beginning) and destruction (end) of *psyche*, both now to be found in the reciprocal and equal exchange of blood/fire—fire/blood. Thus the soul's beginning is discovered in the (organism's unobserved) hot blood-exhalation becoming fire; its end is found when an equal measure of fire is liquefied back into blood. This interpretation, in turn, requires another problematical metaphor in B36: *hydor* ("water" in the ordinary sense) must stand for "blood and other bodily humors" (presumably on the grounds that both are liquids), affording the paradoxical conclusion, "from *hydor* (= blood) *psyche*." Such a reading, of course, requires an "exhalation" theory of the origin of the *psyche*.

This reconstruction is essentially Marcovich's⁶¹ ingenious explanation (but without his, as always, learned argument), but it can be extracted from B45 only by making the saying unintelligible as it stands. However, as Marcovich himself has done more than anyone to demonstrate, the complete genuine sayings are self-contained, and so have at least one meaning, if only

a trivial one, which does not require either a context or the importation of theories of which the ordinary Ephesian would have been innocent.

An alternative line of physiological interpretation for B45, following a pattern first set by Diels, is to pursue some connection between soul in the human microcosm, and cosmic fire in the macrocosm (which connection Heraclitus certainly intuited), and then to use this connection to give a physiological reading to the saying. Exegetical ingenuity, however, has been forced to range rather far afield for its connections. Even Kirk and Raven, in the first edition a work committed to caution when depending on the doxography⁶² in the absence of *ipsissima verba*, offer a series of mainly doxographically dependent statements (excerpted below, but not in the order printed by them) in order to extract a physiological interpretation,⁶³ as follows.

(1) "Thus the intellect is explicitly placed in the soul." No defense for this is given; the formulation at least sounds Platonic or post-Platonic, as though the "intellect" or *nous* were a faculty of the soul, and Heraclitus, like Aristotle or Aquinas, distinguished between *intellectus* and *anima*.

(2) The soul, which can move to all parts of the body at will, nevertheless has limits it cannot reach. But the image (and explanation) is borrowed from the spider rushing to a damaged part of its web, an analogy for soul ascribed to Heraclitus in the Latin *scholium* by Hisdosus on Chalcidius' commentary on the *Timaeus*, and not earlier.

(3) The soul in its true and effective state is composed of fire. Probably true, but in defense are cited B36, which says nothing about fire, and B21, which says nothing about souls.

(4) The efficient soul is dry (citing B118), but then adding the gloss "that is, fiery."

(5) The soul is a portion of the cosmic fire, citing as evidence that Macrobius said that Heraclitus said that the soul was a spark of the essence of stars. The Latin text is:

*Heraclitus physicus (sc. dixit animum esse) scintellam stellaris essentiae.*⁶⁴

Out of this heterogeneous collection, Kirk and Raven derive the interpretation for B45 that the "limits of soul" which cannot be reached refer "probably" (there seems some loss of confidence here) not so much to "the problem of consciousness as to the soul being a representative portion of cosmic fire—which, compared with the individual, is obviously of vast extent." This seems needlessly recondite; a more obvious and parsimonious interpretation, and a more natural one, I suggest, is the psychological interpretation offered above.

Conclusion

In this paper I have defended a psychological, rather than a physiological, version of the three *psyche-logos* sayings. I have, in addition,

explored clues to their revised interpretation in the Homeric and epic tradition which Heraclitus shared with his audience, and which he so often exploits in the sayings in communicating with them. All three sayings were discovered to be part of the philosopher's relentless polemic, this on the level of thought and of discourse, with *anthropoi*, most contemporary Hellenes. This polemic with *anthropoi* was, in a perverse way, better recognized by the biographers of late antiquity than it has been by some modern historians, who often prefer to pass over it in silence in favor of the epistemological consequences of *panta rei*, or the metaphysics of fire as a first *arche*. For the Greek biographers of the Hellenistic period, however, Heraclitus became the lonely but quotable misanthrope who, as Guthrie remarks, was "thought to have held the great majority of mankind in contempt." Guthrie,⁶⁵ however, proceeds to accept the misanthropic explanation for the polemical sayings, adding that it is borne out by the philosopher's own writings. He cites, as random sample, some twenty fragments, a figure which (depending on how many fragments are accepted as genuine) may in fact exceed one fifth of the total. Yet for Guthrie, as for the Hellenistic authors who invented a biographical legend to fit the sayings, these twenty sayings remain examples of excessive misanthropism, eloquent explosions from an uncommonly sour disposition. Being rooted in temperament rather than in contemporary provocation, they express a generalized disdain which supposedly fell equally on all or most of humankind.

What is overlooked in such a view is that the target in the polemical sayings seems quite specific: certain conditions, mainly in the areas of how men think and speak (or listen), which belonged to Hellas in the philosopher's own time. Neglected, also, is the fact that this urgent polemic seems to have been central to the philosopher's thought, at, or near, the heart of his message. He is, as some interpreters have argued (among them, in varying ways, are Kirk, Marcovich, Havelock, Gomperz, Owens, to name a few), less a metaphysician of the eternal flux than a reformer who, not unlike Socrates, felt he was called to a kind of cognitive mission. His own words, if we attend closely to the collection of genuine sayings, suggest that his philosophical task as he saw it was to call for, and even to provoke, corrections in the contemporary cognitive and linguistic situation in order to make an unfamiliar *logos* most familiar to all Greeks. These corrections, we hardly need to note, would take place in the individual *psyche*. Less effectively than Socrates' relentless questions to be sure, but still powerfully, the Heraclitean saying provoked in the *psyche* the activity of proper cognition, forcing the mind to concentrate and reflect in a new and perhaps uncomfortable way, so that often (e.g., B107, 45) what begins as a sharp pictorial image yields to an idea that is not. The *psyche* fragments well illustrate this novel cognitive exercise, an activity of the soul, but in the collection it is by no means confined to them.

In comparing the philosophical endeavor of Socrates with that of Heraclitus, we are once again confronted with the familiar doxographic temptation. Knowing the Platonic future as we do, it is tempting to make Heraclitus sound more modern, and thus more Platonic, than in fact he was. In this paper I have tried to resist that temptation and to keep the Heraclitean *psyche* statements at their proper position on an exegetical spectrum between Homer, at one end, and Plato's Socrates, at the other. For as we rightly remark on the originality of Heraclitus' polemical exhortations in the *psyche* fragments, and on the syntax of his peculiar discourse, we also must appreciate that they are at times all too close to the Homeric language and imagery from which the Ephesian philosopher sought with such eloquence to distance himself. Socrates and his discovery of the thinking self as an integrated, autonomous *psyche* in dialogue with itself and others, while discovering for the human mind the invisible patterns of the real, are still in the future.

It has become a commonplace of intellectual history to observe that no thinker, however great, is an intellectual island; all have predecessors to whom they owe substantial debts, or who first started down paths on journeys which only they would finish. This remains true even for a Socrates or a Plato, and not the least among their predecessors who reflected on the *psyche* was Heraclitus. His *psyche* fragments—hopelessly dated as psychological description but somehow hauntingly insightful still—are rightly esteemed as the first, and most remarkable, step toward the discovery of what we yet mean by "soul."

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NOTES

1. An early work stressing the importance of this period was John Burnet's "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul," *Proceedings of the British Academy* VII (1916). Support was added in 1933 (first American edition 1953) from his Edinburgh colleague, A. E. Taylor, in *Socrates: The Man and His Thought* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 134ff. Recent scholars who support the late fifth century as the earliest date for the emergence of a concept of a unitary or integrated soul are Jan Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); E. A. Havelock, *Preface To Plato* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963; reprinted 1983). Both Havelock and Bremmer (independently) connect this development with the spread of literacy in the late fifth century. Documentation for the earlier period can be found in S. M. Darcus, "A Person's Relation to *Psyche* in Homer, Hesiod and the Greek Lyric Poets," *Glotta* 57 (1979), and for the later

period in F. Sarri, *Socrate e la genesi storica dell'idea occidentale di anima* (Rome, 1976), vol. I, pp. 95ff.; vol. II, pp. 120ff. An important contribution, reviewing many of the major texts, and rightly concentrating on linguistic usage, is that of D. B. Claus, *Toward the Soul* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981). A dominating thesis of this work is that *psyche* was always felt as a "life-force word" (the silence of Homer must be explained away, as Claus attempts), but the considerable value of his book can stand independently of this thesis. David Furley notes the still important usage of *phrenes* in the fifth century, and the differences from *psyche* usages. David Furley, "The Early History of the Concept of Soul," *bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, University of London, no. 3 (1956), p. 9.

2. This interpretation of the *psyche/logos* fragments is defended below.

3. The attack on *anthropoi* as deficient (cognitively, linguistically, morally, religiously) is the thrust of more of the extant sayings than any other theme, a fact which has only recently begun to be recognized (e.g., by Havelock, Marcovich, Hussey; see below, and my references in "Preliterate Ages and the Linguistic Art of Heraclitus" in K. Robb (ed.), *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy* (La Salle, IL: the Monist Library of Philosophy, 1983), pp. 153-206).

4. Gradually, the doxographical emphasis on a flux doctrine (first found in Plato's *Cratylus*), or on fire as the material *arche* (not found in Plato, but central to Aristotle's discussion in *Metaphysics Alpha*) has been quietly retired, or at least demoted, in Heraclitean scholarship. The canonical linguistic formulation of universal flux, *panta rei*, in fact had to await Simplicius, well into the Christian era (*Phys.* 1313.1), although often it is attributed to Heraclitus in popular accounts. See the works of Kirk, Marcovich, Havelock, Snell, Deichgraber et al., cited in Robb, "Linguistic Art" (esp. n. 53). Contributions along similar lines—for their time, bold and insightful but often neglected—were made earlier by others, e.g., by William Kirk, *Fire in the Cosmological Speculations of Heraclitus* (Minneapolis, MN: Burgess Publishing Co., 1940); this was a Princeton dissertation influenced by the great work of H. Cherniss, *Aristotle on the Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); H. Gomperz in Robinson (ed.), *Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz* (Boston, MA: Christopher House, 1953); Joseph Owens, "The Interpretation of the Heraclitean Fragments," in C. O'Neil (ed.), *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee, WI: The Marquette University Press, 1959), pp. 148-68.

5. Piling up information did not instruct Hesiod (B40); Homer (and so his reciters) should be flung out of the contests along with Archilochus (B42; like Homer and Hesiod, Archilochus could wield the epic hexameter); Homer, considered the wisest of Hellenes, was fooled by children (B56); Hesiod, that great teacher, got the most fundamental things wrong, e.g., confused night and day (B57); *Blax anthropos*! He loves to soar at every recitation (*logos*) he hears (B87) (punctuating after *anthropos*). What wit (*noos*) or intelligence (*phren*) do they (*anthropoi*) have? They follow the bards of the peoples . . . (B104) (the plural suggests itinerant singers). B28 is probably a reference to Homer (or epic reciters) as masters of both memory and of producing illusions, but this cannot be argued here. The polemic with Homer and the poets, who, for Heraclitus, obviously still control the consciousness of *anthropoi*, goes far beyond this sampling of the explicit references (see below); but by themselves, even these terse fragments reveal an emphasis found in the collection but missing in those later treatments (including many modern ones) which are determined to find a particular metaphysical or cosmological doctrine in the collection.

6. Guthrie's list is convenient and seems comprehensive, perhaps overly so, since it tends to blur those usages which are earlier than 500 B.C. with those which fall only in the next century. But cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 420–24. There is an insightful discussion especially of Gorgias in G. B. Kerferd, "The Doctrine of *Logos* in Literature and Rhetoric" in his *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 78ff.; on a possible "focal" meaning or reference for *logos*, see the comments on p. 83.

7. E.g., by Snell, Claus, Kahn, Jaeger, Frankl, among others, but with no agreement on details of interpretation.

8. Bernays in *Reinisches Museum*, vol. IX, p. 261ff., where he also discusses B101a (Bywater's *fr.* 15). Enthusiasm for Bernays' emendation (*barbarous* to *borborou*) is not much in evidence of late. It would require the translation "when mud holds the souls," thus making them moist.

9. B. Snell, *The Discovery of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1953), p. 17: "The first writer to feature the new concept of soul is Heraclitus." Snell's statement remains fundamentally correct, and his book of permanent value, but a few observations are in order. First, on Heraclitean priority. Elsewhere, Snell acknowledges that Xenophanes' fragment (B.7) concerning transmigration is probably the oldest certain example of a non-Homeric use of the word *psyche*. (*Discovery*, p. 312, n. 21.) Snell does not elaborate, perhaps because not much can be made of this satirical reference along lines which would reveal how the Pythagoreans conceptualized soul. Also, Anaximenes is not mentioned (perhaps because D-K's B2, if rightly given to him rather than to Diogenes, cannot be a "B" fragment). Also, Snell's discovery of the "personality" or of "individuality" in the lyric poets, with suggestions that such discovery approximated, or even attained, the concept of an integrated and even nonmaterial self (chap. 3), is not supported by the extant linguistic evidence. See below, n. 41.

10. Notably in three famous descriptions. First, between Teiresias and Odysseus at *Od.* 10.490ff., where alone of the *psychai* in Hades is that of Teiresias said to have wits (*phrenes*) that are sound; to him alone has been granted *noos* (mental perception), etc. Second, in the scene between Achilles and Patroclus in Achilles' dream at *Il.* 22. 100ff., Achilles seeks to embrace Patroclus but the *psyche* dissolves like smoke and disappears back to Hades, squeaking; Achilles laments that, indeed, in Hades, there is *psyche*, but it is a phantom (*eidolon*) bereft of wits (*phrenes*). Finally, between Odysseus and his mother in Hades at *Od.* 11.218ff. Three times the hero attempts to embrace the *psyche* of Antikleia, but it flies out of his hands like shadows or a dream; the explanation provided is that, once the body has been cremated, and the *thymos* has left the white bones, the *psyche* flies away, fluttering. Popular belief probably accepted that the drinking of blood restored consciousness briefly (as in this scene), but since one would have to journey to the ends of the earth and to the entrance of Hades to provide the required blood, for all practical purposes the blood-restoration ritual is a literary device serving the needs of singers. Without blood, the *psyche* is conscious only in the dreams of the living, as in the Achilles-Patroclus conversation. The peculiar exceptions to the general rules for *psyche* introduced toward the end of Odysseus' Hades journey have been variously explained; see Denys Page in *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), Chap. 2, "Odysseus and the Underworld."

11. The *psyche* (of Hector) left the limbs (*Il.* 22.362, and *passim*); *psyche* leaves through the mouth (*Il.* 9.409, *passim*); from a wound (*Il.* 14.518, *passim*); simply flutters away (*Od.* 11.218, *passim*). *Thymos* can also depart the limbs, but is never said to go anywhere or to have any future existence.

12. On syncope. Sarpedon revives after syncope although his *psyche* had left him (*Il.* 5.396). Andromache, at the sight of her husband's corpse, falls back, *apo de psuchen ekapause*, but then she revives and breathes again, at which point her

thymos is said to have gathered in her *phren*. No mention, as usual, is made of the return of the *psyche* in these cases. See A. Nehering, "Homer's Descriptions of Synopses," *Classical Philology* 42 (1947), pp. 106-21.

13. *Il.* 568-69 (trans. Lattimore). Similar considerations, and the same usage for *psyche*, occur as Hector contemplates fighting Achilles at *Il.* 11.569ff. I have elaborated beyond what the immediate point required because the Agenor passage is a typical example of how *thymos* functions as a quasi-independent agent. E.g., Odysseus tries to explain to Circe his determination to leave her (after five years) and to be on his way home to Penelope: "the *thymos* in me is urgent . . ." (*Od.* 10.84, and *passim*).

14. *Il.* 22.161, *alla peri psuches ktl.*

15. *Od.* 11.65.

16. The sole Homeric mention of a *psyche* departing an animal is at *Od.* 14.426; after Eumaios has killed a swine, our text has "the *psyche* left it" where we would expect, as in other animal cases, a departing *thymos*. Nothing is said of this *psyche* departing for, or taking up residence in, Hades, which would then make this exception more troublesome, as indeed would several such usages. Tentatively, I suggest that the phrasing in this place may have become formulaic in a singer's mind for "it died," and is used for an animal by force of attraction from the many human uses. Finally, early Pythagorean doctrine in this regard cannot be documented, but Aristotle refers to Pythagorean tales (*muthoi*), the word suggesting perhaps something not of recent manufacture, which tell of any chance soul passing into any chance body (*De Anima* 407b20). Xenophanes (B7), at least, explicitly includes animals.

17. E.g., *ker*, *etor*, *kradie/kardia*.

18. *Rep.* 434d-441c.

19. R. Onians, in *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951) stressed the radically concrete, physical, and usually organic references for the consciousness words, as did J. Bohme in *Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos* (Leipzig, 1929), which view (1) ignores their function usage, for example, in such expressions as Zeus took away the hero's *phrenes*, i.e., wits, senses, clearly not an organ, and (2) the fact that *noos* does not seem quite to be an organ, at least not explicitly, as often with *phren/phrenes*, although *noos* is located in the breast. Snell developed the organic model, but modified it in the direction of the consciousness words acting "organ like"; Claus has rightly further stressed the dimension (already present in Snell) of the consciousness words designating highly personified psychological agents which often act almost as independent entities. Each theory neatly explains certain passages but is less adequate for others; none permits a concept of a unitary self of the sort advanced in Plato. Finally, in conversation, a friend and practicing psychiatrist, William Power, M.D., made the insightful remark that the independent psychological agent theory, if truly a part of a popular "belief system," would surely invite, and on a rather generous scale, the practice of psychological "denial." In this regard, one recalls the now almost classic treatment, "Agamemnon's Apology" in E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 1-28. Also see above, n. 13.

20. *Od.* 11.94, *passim*.

21. The point of the Elpenor episode, cf. n. 15 above. The youngest of the companions, who had too much wine the night before, falls off the palace roof and breaks his neck just before Odysseus departs for the Underworld. As yet unburied, Elpenor's is the first *psyche* that Odysseus meets. Elpenor acknowledges the fact that he was not, as yet, the strongest in fighting or in good judgment, remarking that he was nevertheless "good in the boat" and asks Odysseus to plant his oar above his grave. A weeping Odysseus assures him that it will be done. The contrast is between

the lost promise of life ahead when a young man dies and the desolate existence of a *psyche* in Hades.

22. John Burnet, "The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul" cited in n. 1 above.

23. E.g., at *Clouds* 94, *passim*; see Havelock in "The Parody of the Socratic Self in Aristophanes' *Clouds*," *Yale Classical Studies* 22 (1972), pp. 1-18. Also, we might note the less famous parody at *Birds* 1153ff. which credits Socrates with special powers relating to *psychai*. The chorus of birds reports that recently they happened to spot Socrates in the task of summoning up *psychai*; he was in the company of the coward Peisander, who hoped again to see the *psyche* (i.e., "courage") which had deserted him.

24. E.g., the famous circumlocution at *Crito* 47d-e.

25. *Apology* 29d4ff. "... do you not feel guilty when you give no concentration, or no thought at all, to thinking, and to truth, and to your *psyche*, to put in it the best condition possible." And *Apol.* 36ff.: "... until he has first concentrated on the maximum improvement of his own self and his thoughtfulness." In the fifth century, the *phron*-words (verb, noun, and adjective appear in these passages) refer to a process (suggested in the *-sis* ending for the noun) of thinking, of cognating; in the fourth century, a meaning of "prudence" is superimposed on the intellectualist one, where *phronesis* becomes primarily a moral virtue, as in Aristotle's *Ethics*. Hence scholars, such as Burnet and Havelock, seem correct in seeing the Socratic summons to concentrate on the *psyche* and to put it in the best state possible as a summons to an unfamiliar *intellectual* activity, not as a summons to achieve prudence or practical wisdom, or (quoting Havelock, to whom my translations owe debts) even to "the Protestant ethic." I see this cognitive summons to be directly related to the earlier Heraclitean polemic with *anthropoi*.

26. The major texts in the early dialogues are cited in Claus, *Toward the Soul*, pp. 163-80. For my purposes here the many snares of the "Socratic Problem" may be ignored. I note the interesting (but not, I think, successful) attempt of one scholar to use a differing concept of soul (rather than, following Aristotle, the *chorismos* of the Forms) as the criterion for distinguishing the Socratic from the Platonic in Plato. Cf. James Beckman, *The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1979) p. 18ff. There is much that is valuable, however, in this thoughtful book.

27. The language at *Euthyphro* 5d, 6d, 11c is an early example and, in my judgment, typical of the way Socrates spoke; the language of the "itself," the peculiar use of the intensive and reflexive pronouns may have preceded the more technical vocabulary of Plato (also note the parody at *Clouds* 194, and the invention of the *phront*- words). *Idea* and *eidos* appear in the early dialogues (but never clearly the object of a *chorismos*), and may mean no more than "characteristic," retaining a close relationship to the meaning "shape," as in a fixed or enduring shape. The best treatment, not always in agreement with the position taken in this paper, has for some time been that of R. E. Allen, *Plato's Euthyphro and the Early Theory of Forms* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).

28. *Phaedo* 99d-e, 101d-e. The importance of fixing the *logos*, so that words will stay put and not run away (like walking statues) is found in the *Euthyphro* as well, notably 11c.

29. The *nomos* (custom law) was very strong (in Roman times it became part of written law) that a son may not indict a father in court, a point alluded to in the dialogue; hence, Euthyphro's extravagant claim (in indicting his father) to know very precisely (*akribos*, 4e, 5a, 14b) all matters concerning what the gods want is stressed many times in the dialogue (with heavy irony at 13e, add 3d, 4b, 12a, 15d, *passim*).

30. For example, at *Phaedo* 83a-b; also see Havelock's treatment in "The Socratic Self."

31. *Rep.* 392cff., 602c-d, 605c.

32. *Ion* 535b, 536a. In these neglected passages a *psyche* is said to submit to the moments of *mimesis* which Ion induces by his thrilling performances, and Plato's hostility is obvious. The best treatment of *mimesis* remains that of Havelock, *Preface*, chap. 2.

33. *Phaedo* 118aff.

34. H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 14th ed. (Dublin, Zurich, 1969), vol. I, pp. 139-90.

35. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 367ff.

36. *De Anima* 405a25.

37. Arius Didymus ap. *Eusebius P.E.*, 20.

38. Martha Nussbaum, "Psyche in Heraclitus I," *Phronesis* 17 (1972), p. 156.

39. First by Classen (1867); cited with approval by Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (Merida: The Los Andes University Press, 1967), p. 47.

40. Charles Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 107.

41. Snell (*Discovery*, p. 18) has some interesting observations on the lyric poets' preference for the "depth" image (in the *bath-* compounds) over the more Homeric quantitative or spatial images (in the *polu-* compounds) when describing psychological facts, but his conclusions from this seem to go beyond the evidence. Sappho, especially, is singled out by Snell: "she is favored with a glimpse into the uncharted territory of the soul." (*Discovery*, p. 54, emphasis in Snell.) But *psyche* does not appear in her fragments, and in terms of usage of the other soul words her text seems quite conventional, i.e., Homeric. Note that *noos* (e.g., fr. 98) developed an unusual meaning in Lesbian dialect, "fancy" or "imagination," but this is not relevant to the issues of this paper.

42. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII, 126.

43. Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, p. 46.

44. But not on any punctuation. That of Bywater forces the translation: "Am I to value highly . . . ?" The old Skeptical bias died hard.

45. In what follows I will try to expose the reasoning behind what has become the most common interpretation of B107, i.e., that it is a caution about not understanding (by metaphor) the "language" of the senses, or the "reliable messages of the sense" (Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, p. 47). For my purposes here it does not matter precisely what Diels was thinking when he launched this interpretation; what is important is that it has become the standard one, and so we must explore the thinking behind it, and the assumptions required by it. Since it is these that I wish to dispute, perhaps "Diels" at this point in my text may be permitted conveniently to stand for that.

46. The opening paragraphs of Herodotus reveal clearly that the word was not used pejoratively; he claims that he is writing his history in order that the great and marvelous deeds (*megala kai thomasta*) of Hellenes and *barbaroi* alike shall not be forgotten (*Herod.* 1.1, also 1.6, 10, 11, and *passim*). A barbarian ship is simply a foreign ship. The word is also used when Greeks are being disparaged (V. 97), and enough times in all, without a hint of disparagement, to conclude none was present. In Aeschylus' play *Persians* (225, 237, 391) "*barbaros*" is self-referentially used by Persians which, as often noted, would be peculiar if the word implied taint.

47. E.g., by Claus, Marcovich, Snell, even Nussbaum, although she feels the full force of "*barbaros*" as a linguistic term and tries to do justice to it. (Were my own interpretation to prove untenable, I would fall back on hers; in terms of

philosophical content, they do not differ.) Claus writes (citing from six eminent scholars) that for Heraclitus in B107 *psyche* "is a mental agent responsible for interpreting the information received through the senses." *Toward the Soul*, p. 4. The theory and terminology of "sense data" received its first major defense by Bertrand Russell in "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," *Scientia* 4 (1914) followed in the next year by his "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" in *The Monist* 25 (1915). The theoretical groundwork for his basic position had been developed in "On the Nature of Acquaintance," *The Monist* 24 (1914).

48. Expressed by Nussbaum in "*Psyche*," p. 10: "rather bland and vague statement . . ."

49. Kahn, *Art and Thought*, p. 35.

50. Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 38.

51. *Herod.* 1.136.

52. See in addition Havelock's discussion in K. Robb (ed.), *Language and Thought*, p. 16ff. esp. on p. 18. The other authors' works are cited in this paper.

53. As in Snell, but avoiding any reference to D. L.: "But in the last analysis, Heraclitus means to assert that the soul, as contrasted with things physical, reaches into infinity." *Discovery*, p. 17. Frankl connects B45 to B3 because of the allusion in D. L., but avoids the word "infinite"; he gives the fragment a psychological interpretation, however. H. Frankl, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *American Journal of Philology* 59 (1938).

54. In Homer's text the *peirata* are of Okeanos itself, at the ends of the earth (below); in Hesiod the *peirata* more clearly are identified with Okeanos, surrounding the entire earth. As E. Havelock, commenting on *Theogony* 787ff., writes: "Refluent Ocean at the edge of the earth is given geometric position surrounding it, and an arithmetic relationship to that Styx which in Homer is reached only after crossing the Ocean (*Od.* 10.508-15)." From Havelock, "The Cosmic Myths of Homer and Hesiod," forthcoming.

55. "Usually the philosopher's pronouncements have, first of all, a literal and often somewhat trivial meaning behind which, however, there looms an indefinite number of more general and also more profound meanings." H. Gomperz, "Heraclitus of Ephesus," in Robinson (ed.), *Philosophical Studies*, p. 90.

56. *Od.* 10.80-86, 10.508ff., 11.13-22. This feature is noted by Herodotus: "all the finest things are in the ends of the earth." (III, 106.) Havelock ("Cosmic Myths") notes that Ocean and Styx have related positions in Homer, but more vaguely than in Hesiod. See *Od.* 10.511ff.; for Ocean, *Il.* 14.200-01 and 302-3; *Od.* 4.563-8; *Od.* 11.13 and 160-1.

57. *Od.* 11.13.

58. John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1964), p. 47.

59. The saying is quoted in Plutarch perhaps for this reason (*adv. Colot.* 20, p. 1118); Plutarch adds immediately that, of the famous sayings at Delphi (on which he would, of course, be an expert, at least for his own time), Heraclitus considered this one the most divine; Julian, *Or.* vi. p. 185 A.

60. F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 110.

61. Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, p. 366ff.

62. In their introduction, Kirk and Raven observe that an Aristotelian reconstruction (or later ones derived from it) must be based on "relevant and well-authenticated extracts from the philosopher himself." See G. Kirk and J. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 7.

63. Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 205–07. Since my point here is an example of how even the very best scholarship has strained to find a physiological interpretation for B45, I ignore revisions in the new edition of this near classic work.

64. Macrobius, *Somnium Scipionis* 14, 19; D-K 22A15).

65. Guthrie, *History*, p. 412.

APPENDIX

For the reader's convenience, the Greek texts of the three Heraclitean sayings, the revised interpretation of which is the focus of this paper, are appended. I follow Marcovich's text and his divisions into cola, which reflect the segments of the author's rhythmical prose.

B107:

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρωποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα
βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχοντων.

Sextus Emp. *adv. math* VII, 126. Bernays: βαρβόρου ψυχὰς
ἔχοντος

B45:

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἴων οὐκ ἂν ἐξευροιο
πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν.
οὕτω βαθύν λόγον ἔχει.

Sextus Emp. *adv. math* VII, 126. The epical associations are lost in the technically correct translation of Tertullian (*De Anima* II): *Terminos animae nequaquam invenies omnem viam ingrediens*.

B115:

ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν ἀνῆλπον.

Stob. 111.1.180a.

Stobaeus, in fact, attributes the saying not to Heraclitus but to Socrates. Diels, on the basis of what appear to be derivations of the saying in the Hippocratic *corpus*—and in light of the attribution λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς in B45—gave the saying to Heraclitus. Diels also took λόγος to mean “reason”; Marcovich considers this impossible and treats λόγος as meaning “numerical ratio” if the saying is to be taken as Heraclitean (not, for Marcovich, a certainty). E. A. Havelock (in conversation) emphatically denies that *logos* could carry the meaning “reason” either in Heraclitus or Parmenides.

In this paper, and in previous writings on Heraclitus, I have stressed the polemical character of a majority of the genuine sayings, and have argued for a specific target for that polemic within the culture of contemporary Hellas. I have also stressed the intricacy of linguistic formulation for each saying, which often depends, for its full intelligibility, on a shared

epical inheritance between author and audience. And, not of least significance, I have argued that the sayings were designed primarily for oral declamation, that is, that they were intended by their author to be heard by the ear and to be retained in the memory. I conclude by borrowing some neglected words from Professor Edward Hussey of Oxford University on the Heraclitean sayings (*The Presocratics*, p. 38):

These wholesale denunciations are certainly suggestive of mania, not because they are so sweeping but because so much energy has clearly gone into the making of them. It must be remembered that Heraclitus is not writing to be read only, but to be heard and to resound in the memory.

CONSPECTUS NUMERORUM

Diels-Kranz	Marcovich
107	13
45	67
115	112

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